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Optional Forest 
Yeld Taxes 
State legislators are asking, need timber go untaxed until harvest?. 
By Gary D. Kronrad and Clifford A. Hickman 
lthough t e tax reform bill now 
before Congress could mean 
higher income taxes and lower 
profits for tin•Joerland owners, ad va- 
lorem property taxes can still be re- 
&iced by enrollment in special forest 
property tax programs offered by some 
states. Ad valorem taxes on forestland 
have been a concern for more than a 
century. Critics felt that an annual evy 
on fair market value of both land and 
timber encouraged forest exploitation. 
Fairchild (1935) referred to the problem 
as a "deferred-yield bias." The annual 
timber growth (income) is accumulated 
on the stump until final harvest, and 
each year's increment of income is re- 
peatedly taxed year after year until fi- 
nal harvest. A long cash drain discour- 
ages intensive forest management and 
promotes premature cutting (Kleml• 
erer 1980). 
Under the yield tax, enacted by a 
number of states, land is taxed annu- 
ally, but timber goes untaxed until har- 
vest. A gross income tax equal to a per- 
centage of stumpage value is then 
imposed. States with forest-yield taxes 
find that the programs have advan- 
tages and disadvantages (see box on 
page 30). 
Marquis surveyed U.S. yield taxes in 
1952 and found low enrollments. Over 
the years, the Timber Tax Journal has 
followed the trends, as have Williams 
(1957) and Hickman (1982). In a recent 
study of optional-yield taxes, we looked 
at key legislative provisions, the effect 
of each tax on average annual property 
taxes, use of the programs, and prob- 
lems encountered in administering 
them. State foresters recommended 
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neliqible property owner. in growing 
umbers complain that more of the annual 
)ropery-tax burden is shifted to them. 
resident experts on their yield-tax 
laws, and the experts were interviewed 
by telephone. 
Legislative Provisions 
Nine states currently have 11 op- 
tional yield tax laws. Not included in 
this total are 4 repealed statutes appli- 
cable only to properties already en- 
rolled. These are Louisiana's 1910 Re- 
forestation Contract Severance Tax, 
Minnesota's 1927 Auxiliary Forest Tax, 
New York's 1926 Fisher Forest Tax 
Law, and Washington's Reforestation 
Act of 1931. Idaho and Michigan cur- 
rently have two statutes each. Connect- 
icut's 1913 law is the oldest, and Idaho's 
1983 legislation, the most recent. 
Six states (CA, LA, MS, NH, OR, 
and WA) impose mandatory yield 
taxes, under which all forest land- 
owners pay a yield tax at harvest. 
States with mandatory laws were not 
surveyed. 
Optional yield taxes have been 
adopted for a variety of reasons, but 
improved timber management has been 
a primary consideration in all states. 
Other motives include tax relief for for- 
est owners, reforestation of cutover or 
burned areas, forest preservation, and 
economic stability. Purposes less fre- 
quently cited were conservation, tax 
equity, administrative efficiency, and 
multiple-use forestry. 
Alabama is the only state not limiting 
enrollment. Other states restrict ad- 
missions. The most common limitation 
(8 states, 9 statutes) is a minimum acre- 
age. This requirement varies from 1 
acre under Michigan's second law to 50 
acres in New York. Other common re- 
quirements are minimum stocking lev- 
els, maximum per acre values for land 
or timber, and maximum acreages. 
Less frequent restrictions limit enroll- 
ment to land requiring reforestation, 
land with a minimum productive capa- 
bility, or land for which forestry is the 
highest and best use. 
Three states require initial applica- 
tions only, two require them periodi- 
cally, and one requires them annually. 
As a condition of enrollment, 4 states 
stipulate that landowners agree to keep 
their land in timber production for a 
specified number of years. Contracts 
extend from 5 years in Alabama to 50 
years under Idaho's first law. In New 
York, a hybrid application procedure is 
employed. Participants must commit 
their land to timber production for 10 
years, recertify this commitment annu- 
ally, and pay a $25 application fee. Simi- 
lar fees are also collected by Massachu- 
setts and under Idaho's first law. 
Though all optional programs defer 
timber taxes until harvest, tax rates 
vary. In Connecticut, timber more than 
10 years old and cut from tracts en- 
rolled for 10 years or less is taxed at 2 
percent of estimated value. At the op- 
posite extreme, Idaho's first law man- 
dates a 12.5 percent rate. In addition to 
tax deferment, many statutes stipulate 
that certain timber products can be cut 
without incurring a tax obligation. The 
most frequent exemption applies to 
trees cut by landowners for domestic 
use. Other exemptions apply to timber 
used in harvesting operations or re- 
moved in noncommercial cuttings. 
The tax treatment of land differs sub- 
stantially among states. In Hawaii, no 
enrolled land is taxed. Elsewhere, an 
annual modified property tax is im- 
posed. The most common practice is to 
base the land tax on a fixed, reduced, or 
use-value assessment. In two cases, a 
fixed per acre tax is mandated. The hy- 
brid procedures employed in Alabama 
and Connecticut differ from the norm. 
Alabama's law exempts tracts of 160 
acres or less and applies a fixed assess- 
ment to all other properties. Connecti- 
cut's law employs a fixed assessment in 
combination with a 10-mill tax-rate ceil- 
ing. 
Six states require landowners to have 
a formal management plan, and three 
stipulate that public access be allowed. 
To minimize the impact of tax defer- 
ment and modified assessment on local 
government revenues, participants 
must pay a penalty upon either volun- 
tary or involuntary withdrawal from 
the program. In addition, three states 
partially offset revenue losses by mak- 
ing annual payments to local govern- 
ments based on enrolled acreage. In 
Wisconsin, the payments are $0.20/ 
acre/year, in Missouri $0.50/acre/year, 
and under Michigan's first law, $0.70/ 
acre/year. Other objectives are prompt 
restocking and control of grazing. 
Status Quo 
Tax savings possible under optional 
yield programs are shown in table 1. 
Payment figures for the without-yield 
Table 1. Ad valorem tax savings obtained by timberland owners participat- 
Ing in optional yield tax programs, 1983. 
Legislation Ad valorem taxes 
State Enacted Amended Without With Savings 
yield tax yield tax* 
................. yr. ......................................... $/ac./yr. ........................ 
Alabama 1923 1945 
tracts < 160 ac. 1.00 0.00 1.00 
tracts > 160 ac. 1.00 1.00 .00 
Connecticut 1913 1973 10.00 .01 9.99 
Hawaii 1963 1983 .00 .00 .00 
Idaho (1) 1929 1974 1.50 .05 1.45 
Idaho (2) 1983 1984 9.00 .45 8.55 
Massachusetts 1914 1981 22.50 1.12 21.38 
Michigan (1) 1925 1980 3.75 .30 3.45 
Michigan (2) 1917 1977 3.75 .07 3.68 
Missouri 1946 1981 .80 .16 .64 
New York 1974 1979 8.00 2.00 8.00 
Wisconsin 1927 1975 3.50 .74 2.78 
øExcludes average annual equivalent cost of yield tax payments 
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'enaltes and nterest charge. w, Juld help 
.nsure tha* •nrolle, do no th pr,r rn 
a dodg 
tax case reflect the average annual tax 
imposed on land and timber combined, 
and payment figures for the with-yield 
tax case reflect land taxes only. Esti- 
mates are thus overstatements of likely 
savings and ought to be interpreted 
cautiously. In deciding whether or not 
to enroll in a yield-tax program, forest 
owners may not be concerned with fu- 
ture timber tax obligations--especially 
•f they are several years away from 
making a harvest. 
Without the optional yield tax, forest 
owners in Hawaii pay the lowest aver- 
age annual tax while their counter- 
parts in Massachusetts pay the high- 
est. Values range from nothing to 
$22.50/acre/year. With the optional 
yield tax, forest owners in Hawaii con- 
tinue to pay the smallest amount annu- 
ally. Along with owners of 160 acres or 
less in Alabama, they pay nothing. 
Their acreage is exempt. At the oppo- 
site extreme, owners in New York pay 
an average annual land tax of $2 per 
acre. Financial incentives to enroll are 
greatest in Massachusetts and Con- 
necticut and under Idaho's second law. 
In contrast, no financial incentive to en- 
roll exists in Hawaii or for tracts 
greater than 160 acres in Alabama. In 
both states, the annual taxes with or 
without the yield-tax program are 
roughly the same. 
Low enrollments, prevalent in the 
1950s, continue today (table 2). Partici- 
pation varies from no landowners in 
Hawaii to 3,200 in Wisconsin. In no 
state have over 6.5 percent of eligible 
landowners elected to take advantage 
of an optional yield tax. Participation 
rates per eligible acre are somewhat 
higher. The acreage enrolled varies 
from 0 in Hawaii to over 2 million acres 
under Michigan's first law. In Wiscon- 
sin, owners have enrolled 26 percent of 
the state's qualifying forest acreage. 
Overall usage remains stable. In Mas- 
sachusetts, participation is increasing 
by approximately 7 percent per year, 
and Michigan's first law is showing a 5 
percent increase per year. Missouri re- 
ports a decline of 4-5 percent annually. 
In New York, participation is rising at 
an unknown rate, and in Wisconsin, at 
approximately 10 percent per year. 
Reasons for low participation are many, 
and differ somewhat among states (see 
box on page 30). 
The most common difficulty--cited 
for Connecticut, Idaho's first law, Mich- 
igan's two laws, and New York--is the 
inability to ensure that yield-tax reve- 
nues are consistently collected. Some 
states reported that public benefits, 
such as improved management prac- 
tices and greater public access, are not 
being realized; local records are inade- 
quately maintained; and withdrawal 
penalties are not consistently imposed. 
Landowners Timberland 
State Eligible* Enrolled Ratio Eligible* Enrolled Ratio 
Alabama 202,000 I 0.0005 20.3 2.0 0.01 
Connecticut 20,000 179 .90 1.4 29.8 2.17 
Hawaii 30 0 .00 1.0 0 .00 
Idaho (1) 41,000 50 .12 3.0 130.0 4.33 
Idaho (2) 25,000 .... 3.0 .... 
Massachusetts 41,100 2,000 4.87 2,2 146.8 6.56 
Michigan (1) * * 500 .... 2,003,0 ** 
Michigan (2) ........ .8 ** 
Missouri ** 1,010 ** 8.0 310.1 3.88 
New York 100,000 285 .28 5.5 102.7 1.87 
Wisconsin 50,000 3,200 6.40 5.0 1,300.0 26.00 
'Ftgums represent best estimates in most case& 
*No data available. 
Deficiencies in enabling statutes have 
been one source of difficulty. Some laws 
fail to require a management plan, and 
others admit properties too small to 
form economic management units. Hos- 
tility on the part of local tax officials 
has hindered some programs, and in- 
adequate staffing troubles public ad- 
ministrators. 
In Michigan and New York, some lo- 
cal governments are experiencing reve- 
nue shortfalls because of special tax 
treatment extended to forest owners. 
Shortfalls make it difficult to provide 
traditional services. Ineligible prop- 
erty owners, in growing numbers, com- 
plain that more of the annual property 
tax burden is shifted to them. These 
complaints, particularly •f accompanied 
by the general perception that existing 
special forest taxes are not providing 
intended public benefits, may lead to 
pressures for program repeal. 
Proper Design 
Optional yield taxes cannot be effe• 
tire unless forest owners elect to use 
them. Enrollment figures, at first 
glance, would indicate that the pro- 
grams have failed. The exceptions are 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
and Wisconsin, where programs func- 
tion with some degree of success. The 
experience of these states supports the 
position that optional yield taxes can be 
effective •f properly designed. How can 
optional yield-tax programs be im- 
proved? The attributes of successful 
programs and comments of the resident 
experts suggest the following mea- 
sures: 
--An optional yield tax should be im- 
plemented only in those states in which 
forest landowners need some form of 
tax relief to profitably engage in forest 
management. The tax should be 
adopted over other alternatives only 
when shown to be the most efficient, 
-equitable, and politically acceptable 
method of relief. 
--Except for collection of taxes due, 
an optional yield tax should be adminis- 
tered by the agency most knowledge- 
able about forestry, usually the state 
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/ostility on the part of local tax officials 
hindered some programs. 
forestry agency. Taxes should be col- 
lected by local tax collectors. 
--Yield- and annual property-tax obli- 
gations should be structured so that 
the average forest owner does not re- 
ceive an excess subsidy. After adjust- 
me6ts for differences in risk, partici- 
pants should earn their alternative rate 
of return and no more. 
--Landowners who have recently cut 
timber should not be allowed to enroll 
in an optional yield-tax program unless 
they are willing to pay a tax based on 
the volume of timber removed. Without 
this provision, landowners might be 
tempted to cut all merchantable timber 
before application. 
--State revenue-sharing should be in- 
stituted to ensure that local taxing ju- 
risdictions do not suffer severe short- 
falls because of the yield-tax program. 
Since optional yield taxes are designed 
to provide public benefits, their costs 
can fairly be borne by all taxpayers. 
Are Forest Yield Taxes a 
Good Option? 
--Administration is easy and 
inexpensive. 
--Cash-flow problems are mini- 
mized, enabling longer rotations. 
--Risks of fire, blight, insects, and 
price fluctuations are shared by all 
landowners in a state. 
•sadvantages: 
--Local revenues are less predict- 
able. 
--Incentives to restock cutover 
lands are reduced. 
--A bias is created against better 
sites and fast-growing species. 
--Landowners should pay an applica- 
tion fee at enrollment. Fees should at 
least partially cover the administrative 
costs of classifying a property. 
--An optional yield-tax law should 
contain a good definition of eligible for- 
estland. Definitions should be struc- 
tured to accomplish the objectives of 
the law. For example, if the legislative 
purpose is to increase timber produc- 
tion in the state, only commercial for- 
estland should be eligible. A vague deft- 
nition of eligible forestland can lead to 
inequities and inefficiencies. 
--Landowners should be required to 
submit initial and periodically updated 
management plans. This requirement 
will help ensure that enrolled proper- 
ties are managed to accomplish the pro- 
gram objectives. 
--When a property is removed from 
an optional yield-tax program, except 
by means of an eminent domain pro- 
ceeding, the landowner should pay a 
penalty. Penalties and interest charges 
would help ensure that errollees do not 
use the program as a tax dodge or in 
land speculation. 
Photos of the Wisconsin State Senate 
•. 27) and Assembly (above) are courtesy 
of G. D. Konrad. 
--Optional yield-tax programs, once 
enacted, need to be widely publicized. 
Prospective participants need to be 
made aware of the program's 
existence. ß 
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Why Don't More Land- 
owners Enroll? 
Resident ax experts listed the 
following deterrents to yield-tax 
programs, which haven't changed 
much since the fifties: 
--Absence of an obvious tax ad- 
vantage. 
--Lack of awareness of relevant 
tax options. 
--Reluctance to relinquish control 
over management decisions. 
--Unwillingness to allow free 
public access. 
--Reluctance to restrict future 
land-use alternatives. 
-Red tape of application proce- 
dures. 
--Restrictive eligibility criteria, 
--Severe declassification penal- 
•es. 
--Poor program administration. 
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